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Caption: SD40-2 units CP 5675 and CP 5601 were photographed alongside Partridge passing siding on the CP Laggan sub.
This is the high ground near Kicking Horse Pass, just before the main descent of CP's Big Hill though the Spiral tunnels to division point Field BC. The railway is already on a descending grade westward.
Less than a minute after this picture, the brakes were released and this train resumed its westward journey.
On occasion Partridge serves as crew change point instead of Field BC, for crews approaching maximum hours of service.
25 and a half years after my picture, a crew change here ended in tragedy. On 4 February 2019 westbound CP 301-349 rolled away from Partridge just after the relief crew boarded. For details see TSB R19C0015:
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/rail/2019/r19c0015/r19c0015.html
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The 2.2% slope of the Spiral Tunnel routing for the Big Hill includes location Partridge.
“Partridge” was named for CP locomotive fireman Seth Partridge, who was honoured after he heroically rushed down-slope to warn sectionmen sleeping in the Yoho bunkhouse of an imminent landslide on August 9, 1925 – allowing everyone to escape before the building was crushed.
As of 31 March 2020, the report by the TSB for the accident of 4 Feb 2019 was not complete. However Rail Safety Advisory 617-05/19 arising from the investigation is very informative – https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/securite-safety/rail/2019/r19c0015/r19c0015-617-05-19-20190411.html
The idea of changing crews at Partridge instead of Stephen; especially in winter defies my imagination.
I had not yet read the Rail Safety Advisory (link in my previous comment) when I wrote the caption, but if I correctly understand it, the circumstances on the night of 2019 Feb 4-5 were exceptional – hope I got this correct:
The previous crew, despite max D/B and increasing application of air brake, had the train speed increase beyond the allowed maximum 15 MPH – so engineer as per rules employed Emergency air braking, which stopped the train (at Partridge). A supervisor was contacted and steps were taken, but apparently hand brakes were not applied. While this was going on, the first crew neared or reached maximum hours, so a relief crew was brought in. Temperature around 28 below zero. Around 3 hours after emergency braking, some minutes after midnight, before the new crew had time to recharge the train air, the train began to roll downhill.
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/rail/2019/r19c0015/r19c0015.html
“on 8 February 2019, Transport Canada (TC) issued Ministerial Order MO 19-03 (Annex A) requiring that trains stopped by an emergency brake application on a grade of 1.8% or greater (i.e., mountain grade) immediately apply a sufficient number of hand brakes before recharging the air brake system.”
Appendix A includes a table indicating the number of handbrakes to apply by tonnage and grade, up to every car of the train for steep grades and high tonnages.